Corrections by 
Herbicide Effects on Embryo
Implantation and Litter Size
We are concerned over specific scientific
issues reported by Cavieres et al. in the
November 2002 issue of EHP (Cavieres et
al. 2002). The paper, which has already
received considerable attention in the
media, presents conclusions that are not
supported by the experimental design or by
the data; an array of significant inconsisten-
cies and errors are also present in the paper.
Accordingly, we believe that Cavieres et al.
should retract their paper or the journal
should withdraw it until these problems are
addressed.
In the abstract of the paper, Cavieres et
al. (2002) stated that
The data, although apparently influenced by sea-
son, showed an inverted or U-shaped dose–
response pattern for reduced litter size, with the
low end of the dose range producing the greatest
decrease in the number of live pups born. The
decrease in litter size was associated with a decrease
in the number of implantation sites, but only at
very low and low environmentally relevant doses.
The conclusions of Cavieres et al. (2002)
were based on a series of seven developmen-
tal toxicity studies. Five of the experiments
used pregnant mice exposed no earlier than
days 5 or 6 of gestation; therefore, treatment
started after implantation, so the studies
were never capable of assessing effects on
implantation. In only two studies were mice
exposed during or before implantation, but
those studies did not include the “very low
doses” that Cavieres et al. claim preferen-
tially decreased implantation sites with an
inverted U dose–response curve. Thus, the
basis for the authors’ conclusions is in error.
Our second concern is raised by discrep-
ancies between the paper by Cavieres et al.
(2002) and Cavieres’ dissertation (Cavieres
2001). The dissertation and the paper both
appear to report the results of the same
experiments, as evidenced, for example, by
identical tables describing analytical confir-
mation of the doses for the seven studies.
Importantly, there are unexplained discrep-
ancies in the numbers of animals tested and
in the outcomes. For example, when the two
“preimplantation plus organogenesis” stud-
ies were combined in the dissertation, the
control group was not significantly different
from the treated groups. However, Cavieres
et al.’s Table 2 contains data in which nine
animals were deleted from the four groups.
The authors reported statistical significance
for the low-dose group after this manipula-
tion of the data, but they did not explain
why. Although the deletion of two control
animals caused an increase in the mean litter
size for the controls, deletions in other
groups caused a decrease in mean litter size
for the treated groups. The outcome of these
two manipulations accounted for the differ-
ence between treated and control animals
reported by Cavieres et al. (2002), but not
in Cavieres’ dissertation (Cavieres 2001).
Cavieres et al. (2002) provided no reli-
able data to support their conclusion that
the difference between litter size and
implantations was due to resorptions. They
did not count deaths and cannibalizations;
therefore, accurate estimates of litter size are
impossible. 
In their Figure 1 Cavieres et al. (2002)
combined data from studies that followed
critically different designs and thus should
not have been combined. In Cavieres’ disser-
tation (Cavieres 2001), litter size was
reported, but it was not significantly different
for the low-dose “organogenesis” animals.
However, combining those animals with the
“preimplantation plus organogenesis” ani-
mals in Table 1 (Cavieres 2001) created a
significant difference from controls. 
Cavieres et al. (2002) were not consistent
in their presentation of data. In Figure 1 of
their paper, Cavieres et al. show that 62 con-
trol dams were used to determine litter size,
but in Table 2 they show 64 control dams
for the same end point. Although the
authors should not have combined the vari-
ous experiments, they indicated no reason
for having a different number of animals in
two representations of the same end point
from the same collection of experiments.
Cavieres et al. (2002) also reported
potential influence of seasonality on the
experiments. A more plausible explanation is
typical variability between experiments and
that the findings are not related to treat-
ment. The authors did not study seasonality
in a systematic manner. 
Finally, one of the most prominent con-
clusions of Cavieres et al. (2002) is a sub-
stantial overstatement of the findings of the
experiments. They compared the pattern of
the “dose response” with the inverted U,
but the pattern in this case was inconsistent,
even in the most favorable light. When the
experiments are separated, as they should
be, there is no reproducible dose–response
pattern. It appears that the authors used
novel theories to describe inconsistent data.
They also used very selective citation of the
literature to support the inverted U dose–
response hypothesis, without citing the
many unsuccessful attempts to replicate
findings supportive of the hypothesis. 
In conclusion, the paper by Cavieres et
al. (2002) contains numerous discrepancies
and inconsistencies, as well as disagreement
between the results presented in their paper
and in the dissertation (Cavieres 2001) upon
which this paper was based. We believe that
Cavieres et al. (2002) should revise and cor-
rect their paper or it should be withdrawn.
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Reported Seasonal
Dependence of Herbicide
Developmental Toxicity 
in Mice
In their paper published in the November
2002 issue of EHP, Cavieres et al. (2002)
exposed pregnant mice to a commercial
herbicide mixture and determined preg-
nancy outcomes. Separate experiments were
conducted for each season of the year; the
spring exposure occurred between gestation
days (GD) 0 and 15, whereas in the other
seasons, exposure was postimplantation
(GDs 5–15). The authors concluded that,
although apparently influenced by season,
the results showed an inverted or U-shaped
dose–response pattern for reduced litter size
and reduced implantation sites. These
decreases were reported to occur “only at
very low environmentally relevant doses of
the herbicide mixture.” 
These findings are of interest to us, but
we are concerned about several inconsisten-
cies in the reporting and also about the
merging of different groups of data. As a
result, it is not possible to reconstitute the
original data for independent analysis. For
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group are different in Cavieres et al.’s
Figure 1 and Table 2, and among Tables 2,
3, and 4. It is also unclear why Cavieres et al.
(2002) reported a higher number of implan-
tation sites than the number of litter size
recordings (e.g., the summer high-dose
group), especially when the authors stated in
the text that implantations were only
recorded for a subset of litters. The authors
did not explain why they analyzed implanta-
tions on the basis of covariance with final lit-
ter size. The control litter-size data [Figure1B
(Cavieres et al. 2002)] has an unusual distri-
bution, with the mode being the most fre-
quent. The authors tentatively rationalized
their findings in terms of the chemical treat-
ment causing either preimplantation loss or
fetal death. However, preimplantation expo-
sure occurred only in the spring group, and
no significant increases in resorptions were
observed in any group. Thus, in the fall, win-
ter, and summer groups, herbicide-induced
preimplantation loss could not have
occurred; therefore, the reported reduced
implantations and reduced litter sizes in the
absence of an increase in resorptions was an
effect that simply could not be the result of
herbicide exposure. The situation was further
confused by the imperfect correlation
between litter size and implantation sites.
For example, in the very low-dose summer
group, a significant (23%) reduction in litter
size was associated with a significant (12%)
reduction in implantation sites. However, in
the high-dose summer group, the nonsignifi-
cant (7%) reduction in litter size was associ-
ated with a larger, but nonsignificant (15%)
reduction in implantation sites.
Although the test data were tabulated
according to season and a seasonal influence
on test outcome was noted, the data were
merged for all cases where implantation data
existed [Figure 2 (Cavieres et al. 2002)],
ignoring the individual seasonal data. These
seasonal data are shown in Figure 1, in the
format of the Cavieres et al.’s Figure 2
(Cavieres et al. 2002). Significant reductions
in litter size are distributed across all the
dose groups, with the fall data following a
normal monotonic decrease in litter size
(Figure 1). However, Cavieres et al.
excluded these monotonic fall data from
their Figure 2 because of the absence of
implantation data. We suggest that a pri-
mary decision should be made regarding
whether or not the data are seasonally
related. If they are not, the data could be
merged and analyzed as such. If they are, the
merging of data (as presented by Cavieres et
al. in their Figure 2) is invalid, and an expla-
nation for the seasonal influence must be
sought. In the extreme, such a seasonal
influence would lead to an observed normal
monotonic response in the fall and an
inverted U response in the summer for the
same chemical. The animals used in these
experiments (Cavieres et al. 2002) were pur-
chased and maintained for 2 weeks before
the experiments began to allow them to
adjust to the light–dark cycle and tempera-
ture of the animal rooms. Similar conditions
would have applied in the commercial ani-
mal-breeding unit; therefore, the seasonal
perceptions of the mice must have derived
from the journey between the supplier and
the laboratory—an unlikely proposition.
We conclude that substantial uncer-
tainty exists regarding the origin of the litter
size effects reported and that the conclusion
of a low-dose inverted U-shaped dose–
response curve cannot be made at this stage.
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tial conflict of interest as defined in EHP’s
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Asthma and Gulf War
Exposures
As a physician who treats patients with Gulf
War syndrome and multiple chemical sensi-
tivities, and on the basis of my clinical expe-
rience, I believe that these diseases are
related and reflect valid pathophysiologic
and biochemical processes in the body,
which have yet to be clearly defined. The
article by Lange et al. on respiratory illness
among Gulf War veterans (Lange et al.
2002) was industrious in trying to disprove
the validity of the veterans’ complaints—or
at least to infer that they were likely to be
psychologically derived. The study has sev-
eral methodologic shortcomings that need
to be made explicit.
First, the authors state that
[Current] injury and symptoms of major depres-
sion, measures that have little or no biologically
plausible relationship to oil-fire exposure, were
included to serve as control health outcomes.
I have no problems with using “injury” as it
was operationally defined in the study.
However, “depression” as defined has at least
two confounding and confusing correlations:
First, if currently depressed subjects were
chronically depressed, their perception of
“level of preparedness” could be quite low,
regardless of how well they were trained,
because of their ongoing insecurities and low
self-esteem. Second, if, in fact, Gulf War
exposures made the subjects feel chronically
ill, whether this was physiologic or psycho-
logic in origin, their inability to lead normal
lives could exacerbate preexisting depression
or produce the reactive depression that is
often seen in chronic disabling illness. These
considerations make “depression” a poor
independent variable. However, its use allows
Lange et al. (2002) to graph similar curves
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Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the data from Cavieres et al.’s Tables 2 and 4 (Cavieres et al. 2002) by
season. ND, not determined. Cavieres et al. (2002) did not determine implantation numbers in the fall
experiments or in the winter low-dose group or the spring very low-dose group.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; statistical assessments reported by Cavieres et al.
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Correspondencefor asthma, bronchitis, and depression (their
Figure 3), all independent of modeled expo-
sure to oil-fire smoke. The authors ascribed
all of this to “recall bias.” Furthermore, a
reader might easily infer that since the expo-
sure model is “more objective” and shows no
significant correlations in this study, and the
veterans’ complaints of asthma and bronchi-
tis are strongly correlated with depression, all
of their complaints might well be psycho-
logic in nature.
The second methodologic shortcoming
is that nowhere did Lange et al. (2002)
mention that oil-fire smoke and particles
are only part of the hypothesized causes of
Gulf War–induced respiratory complaints.
They did not mention that similar studies
should be undertaken to correlate symptom
reports and demographics with exposure to
chemical warfare agents (or their destruc-
tion), pesticide use [such as N,N-diethyl-m-
toluamide (DEET)], volatile organic
hydrocarbon exposure, vaccine administra-
tion, or antichemical warfare treatment,
among other hypothesized agents. Taking
these factors into consideration, the impact
of Lange et al.’s study is far more limited
than their hypothesis and conclusions
would suggest; also, their study has a built-
in bias that emphasizes psychologic factors.
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Asthma and Gulf War
Exposures: Response
As clearly stated in the introduction of our
paper (Lange et al. 2002), there are many
deployment-related exposures that have been
suggested as causes for illnesses observed
among veterans of the Gulf War. In our
study we investigated the hypothesis that 
self-reported symptoms of respiratory illnesses
after the war may have been related to modeled
and self-reported exposures to oil-fire smoke.
Our study (Lange et al. 2002) was not
designed to address other exposures of
potential significance.
In order to recognize the possibility of
recall bias, our study included health condi-
tions that had little biological plausibility
for a relationship with oil-fire smoke expo-
sure. Gordon takes issue with our use of
major depression as one of these conditions.
We agree that one can construct a scenario
whereby exposure to smoke in 1991 could
result in recent symptoms of major depres-
sion in 1996 or injury within the past 3
months in 1996. However, these possibili-
ties are remote compared to the pulmonary
outcomes of asthma and bronchitis. Beyond
recognizing the possibility of recall bias
within the self-reported measures used in
our study, identifying the nature of this bias
or the effect of other exposures was not
within the scope of our study.
The author declares he has no conflict of interest.
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Communication in
Emergencies
In their Commentary “Ethical Perspectives
for Public and Environmental Health,”
Lambert et al. (2003) paraphrased a 1990
editorial that I coauthored with Lester Lave
(Morgan and Lave 1990) to create a straw
man against which to contrast their proposal
that emergency communication should fos-
ter understanding and autonomy.
Our text (Morgan and Lave 1990) that
Lambert et al. (2003) referenced reads, 
There is wide, if not universal, agreement that
attempts to manipulate behavior are appropriate
when people are faced with large, immediate dan-
gers. Officials are expected to issue explicit orders
for action to people living in the path of a hurri-
cane’s storm surge or downwind of the spreading
chlorine plume from a tank car accident, rather
than just provide neutral messages for partici-
pants to weigh. Indeed, in such circumstances, if
risk communications cannot get people to move
out of harm’s way, more intrusive measures, such
as police, may be used.
Lambert et al. (2003) wrote, 
In contrast, by embracing the concept of foster-
ing autonomy, the public can formulate and
share the imperative. The right to know means
that people need to understand the reason behind
evacuation, verbal injunctions, or barricades.
Manipulation and coercion may save some lives,
but they certainly do not foster understanding.
My colleagues and I are strong propo-
nents of providing people with full under-
standing so that they can make independent
informed decisions. Our recent book, Risk
Communication (Morgan et al. 2002), is
entirely built on this philosophy. In it we
define risk communication as
communication intended to supply laypeople
with the information they need to make
informed independent judgments about risks to
health, safety and the environment.
Even in crisis situations, officials should
try to supply complete and balanced informa-
tion within the constraints of the situation.
But if a chlorine plume is about to engulf my
family’s house, I want the state police to get
them out as quickly as possible; I would be
completely satisfied if the only explanation at
the time was, “Madam, I’m Officer Jones of
the Pennsylvania State Police. There has been
a terrible chemical accident, so we must get
you and your family out of here right now.
We’ll explain more later.” 
The author declares he has no conflict of interest.
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Communication in
Emergencies: Response
In our paper (Lambert et al. 2003), we did
not advocate neutral messages in acute
emergency response situations and agreed
with Morgan and Lave (1990) that we have
a responsibility to prevent people from
entering harm’s way. However, we pre-
sented an argument for fostering autonomy
rather than the use of manipulation and
coercion in these situations.
Hague (1929) distinguished ethical risk
communication as an issue of persuasion as
opposed to coercion. Faden and Beauchamp
(1986) defined these extremes: 
Persuasion is restricted to influence by appeal to
reason, the intentional and successful attempt to
induce a person, through appeals to reason, to
freely accept—as his or her own—the beliefs,
attitudes, values, intentions or actions advocated
by the persuader.
According to Faden and Beauchamp (1986),
coercion occurs if someone 
A 452 VOLUME 111 | NUMBER 9 | July 2003 • Environmental Health Perspectives
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by presenting a credible threat of unwanted or
avoidable harm so severe that the person is unable
to resist acting to avoid it.
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) filled the
middle ground by distinguishing forms of
manipulation. They described manipulation
as 
the catch-all term for communication that is nei-
ther coercion nor persuasion; intentional and
non-successful non-coercive influence altering the
available choices of an individual, or a perception
of those choices and influence that does not
appeal to reason.
The essence of manipulation is having people
unwittingly do what the manipulator intends
for them to do. Faden and Beauchamp
(1986) argued that ethical health risk com-
munication is persuasion or, at worst, unin-
tentional manipulation because it cannot be
avoided.
Unintentional manipulation may occur
through several avenues. Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that, by
framing information in particular ways (for
example, in the health context, the proba-
bility of dying or living from a given proce-
dure), the choices that people (including
health care providers) make can be directed
to a significant degree. Therefore, when
“mere information” is presented, the pre-
sentation itself will include the danger of
manipulative elements, and there is a need
to recognize this dilemma and confront it.
Informational manipulation occurs when
the structure of perception of choices is
altered by managing information to pro-
mote a desired action. Further, to varying
degrees, nonsubstantive elements such as
tone, manner, and order; word choice; time
and setting; and the appearance, style, and
charisma of the presenter can be forms of
psychologic manipulation.
In his letter, Morgan has clarified his
perspective and provided a communication
example that does not appear to argue for
manipulation. In the case of an acute emer-
gency, Morgan would be satisfied with the
following communication: “Madam, I’m
Officer Jones …. There has been a terrible
chemical accident, so we must get you and
your family out of here right now. We’ll
explain more later.” 
This communication does allow the
woman to “formulate and share the impera-
tive,” share the officer’s urgency for evacua-
tion, and understand the reason, (i.e.,
“there has been a terrible chemical acci-
dent”). Perhaps if the message also included
more context, “that the plume is about to
engulf your home,” a stronger argument
could be made for the woman’s ability to
formulate the imperative. Further, the
woman may be able to spread the risk mes-
sage to her friends who may not be reached
by the police officers. As we argued in our
paper (Lambert et al. 2003), this is a benefi-
cial consequence of communication that
fosters autonomy as opposed to manipula-
tion. The message concludes with “we’ll
explain more later.” This implies an ongo-
ing relationship and dialogue with the
woman to further foster her understanding.
In this example, however, the police offi-
cer may introduce “unintentional” manipula-
tion. The police officer, in rushing from door
to door telling people to evacuate, by his or
her presence, tone, and excitement, will carry
the message of the urgency of the evacuation.
This will, to some degree, introduce elements
of unintentional manipulation.
The communication example does not
involve an attempt to manipulate the
woman’s behavior or defend this approach
to prevent her from being harmed. It is
consistent with the argument in our paper
(Lambert et al. 2003).
The author declares he has no conflict of interest. 
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CORRECTIONS
In “Longterm Follow-Up of Residents of
the Three Mile Island Accident Area:
1979–1998” [EHP 111:341–348 (2003)])
Talbott et al. attributed a statement to
Maureen Hatch through a reference that
was incorrect and would like to correct the
error. In addition, there was an incorrect
reference to one of her works that
appeared several times. 
On page 342 (second column, line 18
of the second paragraph), the Hatch et al.
reference (Hatch et al. 1991) should not
have been included; the corrected sentence
appears below:
Additionally, individual exposures were not
known but estimated. Several other researchers
indicated that the exposures may have been
several orders of magnitude larger than origi-
nally estimated (Wing and Richardson 2000).
Also, Talbott et al. (2003) incorrectly
referenced “Hatch et al. 1991” through-
out their paper; the correct reference is as
follows: 
Hatch MC, Beyea J, Nieves JW, Susser M. 1990. Cancer
Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant: Radiation
Emissions. Am J Epidemiol 132(3):397–412. 
Thus, “Hatch et al. 1991” should be
replaced with “Hatch et al. 1990”
throughout the text of Talbott et al.’s
paper (Talbott et al. 2003); the specific
locations are as follows: a) page 341, sec-
ond column, last paragraph; b) page 341,
third column, second paragraph; c) page
342, second column, second paragraph;
d) page 343, first column, third para-
graph; e) page 343, second column, first
line; and f ) page 347, second column,
third paragraph.
The authors regret the errors.
In the March Focus article “The Earth’s
Open Wounds: Abandoned and
Orphaned Mines” [EHP 111:A154–A161
(2003)], EHP incorrectly characterized
states’ receipt of funding under the U.S.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act (SMCRA) of 1977 by saying that the
states of New Mexico, Colorado,
Wyoming, Montana, Utah, and Washing-
ton receive SMCRA funds. In fact,
although these states are eligible to receive
SMCRA funds, they may or may not have
applied for them. EHP regrets the error.
Correspondence